Political Science: Mission Command

5-7 page essay not including cover page and reference page with at least 4-6 scholarly references (internet and attached refences)

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site

(https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site

(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

https://armypubs.army.mil/

https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard

*ADP 6-0

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication supersedes ADP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012, and ADRP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0 i

Army Doctrine Publication

No. 6-0
Headquarters

Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 31 July 2019

Mission Command:
Command and Control of Army Forces

Contents

Page

PREFACE…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. iii

INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………………………….. vii

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO MISSION COMMAND …………………………………………………… 1-1
The Nature of Operations ……………………………………………………………………………… 1-1
Unified Land Operations ……………………………………………………………………………….. 1-2
Mission Command ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 1-3
Principles of Mission Command …………………………………………………………………….. 1-6
The Role of Subordinates in Mission Command …………………………………………….. 1-14
Command and Control ……………………………………………………………………………….. 1-16
The Command and Control Warfighting Function …………………………………………… 1-19
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1-21

Chapter 2 COMMAND…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2-1
Nature of Command …………………………………………………………………………………….. 2-1
Elements of Command …………………………………………………………………………………. 2-1
The Role of Commanders in Operations ……………………………………………………….. 2-12
Guides to Effective Command ……………………………………………………………………… 2-16
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 2-24

Chapter 3 CONTROL ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3-1
Nature of Control …………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-1
Elements of Control ……………………………………………………………………………………… 3-3
Control Measures ………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-10
Guides to Effective Control ………………………………………………………………………….. 3-14
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3-17

Chapter 4 THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM …………………………………………………… 4-1
Command and Control System Defined ………………………………………………………….. 4-1
Organizing for Command and Control …………………………………………………………… 4-13
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4-15

SOURCE NOTES …………………………………………………………………….. Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY …………………………………………………………………………………… Glossary-1

REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………………. References-1

Preface

ii ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

INDEX ………………………………………………………………………………………………… Index-1

Figures

Introductory figure-1. Logic map ………………………………………………………………………………………….. x

Figure 1-1. Levels of control ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-6

Figure 1-2. Combat power model …………………………………………………………………………………… 1-20

Figure 2-1. Achieving understanding ………………………………………………………………………………… 2-4

Figure 2-2. The operations process ………………………………………………………………………………… 2-13

Figure 2-3. The commander’s role in the operations process …………………………………………….. 2-14

Figure 2-4. Commander’s visualization …………………………………………………………………………… 2-15

Figure 2-5. Map of Ruhr encirclement …………………………………………………………………………….. 2-19

Figure 3-1. Reciprocal nature of control ……………………………………………………………………………. 3-4

Figure 3-2. Map of Austerlitz, the initial situation ………………………………………………………………. 3-12

Figure 3-3. Map of Austerlitz operations ………………………………………………………………………….. 3-13

Figure 4-1. Components of a command and control system ………………………………………………… 4-1

Tables

Introductory table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms ………………………………………………. ix

Table 3-1. Operational variables ………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-5

Table 3-2. Mission variables ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-6

Vignettes

Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik …………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-4

Command Based on Shared Understanding and Trust: Grant’s Orders to Sherman, 1864 ……… 1-9

Initiative: U.S. Paratroopers in Sicily ……………………………………………………………………………….. 1-13

Corporal Alvin York and Mission Command …………………………………………………………………….. 1-15

Assuming Command: General Ridgway Takes Eighth Army ……………………………………………….. 2-2

Risk Acceptance: OPERATION HAWTHORN, Dak To, Vietnam………………………………………….. 2-8

Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement …………………… 2-18

Levels of Control and German Auftragstaktik …………………………………………………………………….. 3-2

Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War …………………………………………………………….. 3-10

Control in Austerlitz ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-11

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file:///C:/Users/michael.lance.waller/Desktop/ADPs/ADP%206-0/ADP%206-0_18%20JULY%202019.docx%23_Toc14334049

file:///C:/Users/michael.lance.waller/Desktop/ADPs/ADP%206-0/ADP%206-0_18%20JULY%202019.docx%23_Toc14334050

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 iii

Preface

ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, provides a discussion of the

fundamentals of mission command, command and control, and the command and control warfighting

function. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art and science of command

and control to understand situations, make decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission

accomplishment.

To comprehend the doctrine contained in ADP 6-0, readers should understand the nature of operations and

the fundamentals of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0, Operations. Army leadership attributes

and competencies are vital to exercising command and control, and readers should also be familiar with the

fundamentals of leadership in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, and FM 6-22, Leader Development. The Army

Ethic guides decisions and actions while exercising command and control, and readers must understand the

ideas in ADP 1-1, The Army Profession. As the operations process is the framework for exercising command

and control, readers must also understand the fundamentals of the operations process established in ADP 5-0,

The Operations Process.

The doctrine in ADP 6-0 forms the foundation for command and control tactics, techniques, and procedures.

For an explanation of these tactics and procedures, see FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and

Operations. For an explanation of the techniques associated with command and control, see ATP 6-0.5,

Command Post Organization and Operations, as well as other supporting techniques publications.

The principal audience for ADP 6-0 is Army commanders, leaders, and unit staffs. Mission command

demands more from subordinates at all levels, and understanding and practicing the mission command

principles during operations and garrison activities are imperative for all members of the Army Profession.

The Army historically fights with joint and multinational partners as part of a coalition, and ADP 6-0 is

nested with joint and multinational doctrine. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters that require joint

capabilities to conduct operations, or serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters, should also

refer to applicable doctrine concerning command and control of joint or multinational forces.

ADP 6-0 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreement 2199, Command and

Control of Allied Land Forces.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,

international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their

Soldiers operate in accordance with the Army Ethic, the law of war, and the rules of engagement. (See

FM 27-10 for a discussion of the law of war.)

ADP 6-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the

glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with

an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in

the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent

publication follows the definition.

ADP 6-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and

United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 6-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Mission Command Center of Excellence. Send comments and

recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to

Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ADP 6-0),

300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to

[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

mailto:[email protected]

This page intentionally left blank.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 v

Acknowledgements

The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. The Source

Notes lists other sources of quotations and photographs.

Excerpts from On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Michael E.

George Patton, Ruth Patton Totten, John K. Waters, Jr., and George P. Waters. Reprinted by

Quote reprinted courtesy Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in

renewed 2000 by Copper Square Press.

Quote courtesy Logan Nye, “How the ‘Little Groups of Paratroopers’ Became Airborne Legends,” We

Are the Mighty, 8 April 2016. Online

http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12.

Quote courtesy Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering or Epithets of War. Oxford, United

Kingdom: Alden Press, 1953.

permission of Andesite Press, 2017.

by British Ministry of Defence Crown.

William Slim. Reprinted 1962 by Orion Publishing Group.

Excerpts from William M. Connor, “Establishing Command Intent, A Case Study: The Encirclement

of the Ruhr, March 1945” in The Human in Command: Exploring The Modern Military

Academic/Plenum Press.

Quote courtesy Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant,

Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2. Edited by William S. McFeely and Mary Drake McFeely.

by B. H. Liddell Hart.

1990 by Robert A. Doughty.

Quote courtesy Richard E Simpkin and John Erickson, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal

Quote courtesy George S. Patton, Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S.

http://freerepublic.com/focus/fchat/3535576/posts?page=12

Acknowledgements

vi ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Quote reprinted courtesy Erin Johnson, “Schwarzkopf Speaks of Leadership at Symposium,” The

Daily Universe, 21 October 2001. Online https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-

speaks-of-leadership-at-symposium/.

Quote courtesy Lt.-Col. Simonds, Commandant, “Address to Canadian Junior War Staff Course,

24 April 1941.” Online https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-

defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-

lineages/reports.html.

Schwarzkopf speaks of leadership at symposium

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 vii

Introduction

This revision to ADP 6-0 represents an evolution of mission command doctrine based upon lessons learned

since 2012. The use of the term mission command to describe multiple things—the warfighting function, the

system, and a philosophy—created unforeseen ambiguity. Mission command replaced command and control,

but in practical application it often meant the same thing. This led to differing expectations among leadership

cohorts regarding the appropriate application of mission command during operations and garrison activities.

Labeling multiple things mission command unintentionally eroded the importance of mission command,

which is critical to the command and control of Army forces across the range of military operations.

Differentiating mission command from command and control provides clarity, allows leaders to focus on

mission command in the context of the missions they execute, and aligns the Army with joint and

multinational partners, all of whom use the term command and control.

Command and control—the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over

assigned and attached forces—is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military

function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Commanders are responsible for

command and control. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to

integrate all military activities towards a common goal—mission accomplishment. Military operations are

inherently human endeavors, characterized by violence and continuous adaptation by all participants.

Successful execution requires Army forces to make and implement effective decisions faster than enemy

forces. Therefore, the Army has adopted mission command as its approach to command and control that

empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

The nature of operations and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command.

Mission command traces its roots back to the German concept of Auftragstaktik (literally, mission-type

tactics). Auftragstaktik was a result of Prussian military reforms following the defeat of the Prussian army

by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena in 1809. Reformers such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August von

Gneisenau, and Helmuth von Moltke sought to develop an approach for planning campaigns and

commanding large armies over extended battlefields. At the heart of the debate was a realization that

subordinate commanders in the field often had a better understanding of what was happening during a battle

than the general staff, and they were more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities

if they were allowed to make decisions based on this knowledge. Subordinate commanders needed the

authority to make decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the

plan. After decades of debate, professionalization of the army, practical application during the

Danish-Prussian War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Russian War of 1870,

Auftragstaktik was codified in the 1888 German Drill Regulation.

In Auftragstaktik, commanders issue subordinate commanders a clearly defined goal, the resources to

accomplish the goal, and a time frame to accomplish the goal. Subordinate commanders are then given the

freedom to plan and execute their mission within the higher commander’s intent. During execution,

Auftragstaktik demanded a bias for action within the commander’s intent, and it required leaders to adapt to

the situation as they personally saw it, even if their decisions violated previous guidance or directives. To

operate effectively under this style of command requires a common approach to operations and subordinates

who are competent in their profession and trained in independent decision making.

Aspects of mission command, including commander’s intent, disciplined initiative, mission orders, and

mutual trust, have long been part of U.S. Army culture. The most successful U.S. Army commanders have

employed elements of mission command since the 18th century. Grant’s orders to Sherman for the campaign

of 1864 and Sherman’s supporting plan are models of clear commander’s intent, mission orders, and

understanding based on mutual trust. (See the vignette on page 1-9.) When addressing operations orders, the

Army’s 1905 Field Service Regulation contained the following passage that served as an early discussion of

mission orders:

Introduction

viii ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

An order should not trespass on the province of the subordinate. It should contain

everything which is beyond the independent authority of the subordinate, but nothing more.

When the transmission of orders involves a considerable period of time, during which the

situation may change, detailed instructions are to be avoided. The same rule holds when

orders may have to be carried out under circumstances which the originator of the order

cannot completely forecast; in such cases letters of guidance is more appropriate. It should

lay stress upon the object to be attained, and leave open the means to be employed.

Eisenhower’s general plan and intent for the 1944 invasion of Europe and defeat of Nazi Germany is an

example of mission command that guided Allied forces as they fought their way from Normandy to the Rhine

and beyond. A more recent example is the 3rd Infantry Division’s march to Baghdad in 2003 and the

subsequent “thunder runs” that showed the world that the Iraqi regime was defeated. Retired General David

Perkins (a brigade commander during this operation) writes, “These thunder runs were successful because

the corps and division-level commanders established clear intent in their orders and trusted their

subordinates’ judgment and abilities to exercise disciplined initiative in response to a fluid, complex problem,

underwriting the risks that they took.”

Mission command requires tactically and technically competent commanders, staffs, and subordinates

operating in an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding. It requires building effective teams

and a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to take risks and exercise disciplined

initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Through mission orders,

commanders focus their subordinates on the purpose of an operation rather than on the details of how to

perform assigned tasks. This allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action in the context of a

particular situation. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary

conditions for success by allocating resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks.

Commanders need support to exercise command and control effectively. At every echelon of command,

commanders are supported by the command and control warfighting function—the related tasks and a system

that enables commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. Commanders execute

command and control through their staffs and subordinate leaders.

This publication provides fundamental principles on mission command, command and control, and the

command and control warfighting function. Key updates and changes to this version of ADP 6-0 include—

 Combined information from ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 into a single document.

 Command and control reintroduced into Army doctrine.

 An expanded discussion of command and control and its relationship to mission command.

 Revised mission command principles.

 Command and control system reintroduced, along with new tasks, and an updated system

description.

 Expanded discussion of the command and control system.

ADP 6-0 contains 4 chapters:

Chapter 1 provides an overview of mission command, command, and control. It describes the nature of

operations and the Army’s operational concept, and how it is enabled by the mission command. It then

discusses the function of command and control, and how commanders create conditions for mission

command to flourish. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the command and control warfighting

function.

Chapter 2 defines and describes command. It describes the nature of command, provides the elements of

command, describes the role of the commander in operations, and offers guides to effective command.

Chapter 3 defines and describes control and its relationship to command. It discusses the elements of control

and guides to effective control. Finally, this chapter discusses the importance of knowledge management and

information management as they relate to control.

Chapter 4 discusses the command and control system that performs the functions necessary to exercise

command and control. This includes a discussion of the people, processes, networks, and command posts

Introduction

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 ix

that are components of the command and control system. It also discusses command post design and

organization considerations.

Introductory table-1 lists modified terms and acronyms. The introductory figure-1 on page x illustrates the

ADP 6-0 logic map.

Introductory table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms

Term or Acronym Remarks

art of command No longer defines term.

authority No longer defines term.

civil considerations ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term and modifies the
definition.

command and control Adopts the joint definition.

command and control system New Army definition.

commander’s visualization ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

common operational picture Modifies the definition.

data New definition.

essential element of friendly information ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term and modifies the
definition.

information New definition.

information protection No longer defines term.

information system No longer defines term.

knowledge New term and definition.

key tasks ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

mission command New Army definition.

mission command system Rescinds term.

mission command warfighting function Rescinds term.

prudent risk Rescinds term.

relevant information New term.

science of control No longer defines term.

situational understanding ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

understanding New term and definition.

Introduction

x ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Introductory figure-1. Logic map

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-1

Chapter 1

Introduction to Mission Command

The situations that confront a commander in war are of infinite variety. In spite of the most

careful planning and anticipation, unexpected obstacles, frictions, and mistakes are

common occurrences in battle. A commander must school himself to regard these events

as commonplace and not permit them to frustrate him in the accomplishment of his mission.

FM 100-5, Operations (1941)

This chapter sets the context for understanding mission command and command and

control by describing the nature of operations and summarizing the Army’s operational

concept. It defines and describes mission command as the Army’s approach to

command and control that enables unified land operations. Then it defines and

describes command and control, their relationship to each other, and their elements.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the command and control warfighting

function.

THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS

1-1. Military operations fall along a competition continuum that spans cooperation to war. Between these
extremes, societies maintain relationships. These relationships include economic competition, political or

ideological tension, and at times armed conflict. Violent power struggles in failed states, along with the

emergence of major regional powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea seeking to gain strategic

positions of advantage, present challenges to the joint force. Army forces must be prepared to meet these

challenges across the range of military operations during periods of competition and war.

1-2. The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and
operations in scope and purpose against the backdrop of the competition continuum. The potential range of

military activities and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, up

through large-scale combat operations in war. Whether …

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site

(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

*ADP 5-0

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This manual is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes ADP 5-0, dated 17 May 2012, and ADRP 5-0, dated 17 May 2012.

Army Doctrine Publication
No. 5-0

Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, D . 31 July 2019

THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
Contents

Page

PREFACE…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. iii
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………. v

Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS ……………………………………. 1-1
The Nature of Operations ……………………………………………………………………………… 1-1
Unified Land Operations ……………………………………………………………………………….. 1-2
Mission Command ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 1-3
The Framework of the Operations Process ……………………………………………………… 1-4
Principles of the Operations Process ……………………………………………………………… 1-7
Integrating Processes …………………………………………………………………………………. 1-15
Battle Rhythm ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-17

Chapter 2 PLANNING …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2-1
Fundamentals of Planning …………………………………………………………………………….. 2-1
The Science and Art of Planning ……………………………………………………………………. 2-2
The Functions of Planning …………………………………………………………………………….. 2-3
Planning and the Levels of Warfare ……………………………………………………………….. 2-7
Operational Art ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2-10
Integrated Planning ……………………………………………………………………………………. 2-15
Key Components of a Plan ………………………………………………………………………….. 2-19
Guides to Effective Planning ……………………………………………………………………….. 2-21
Planning Pitfalls …………………………………………………………………………………………. 2-25

Chapter 3 PREPARATION ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3-1
Fundamentals of Preparation ………………………………………………………………………… 3-1
Guides to Effective Preparation ……………………………………………………………………… 3-2
Preparation Activities ……………………………………………………………………………………. 3-4

Chapter 4 EXECUTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4-1
Fundamentals of Execution …………………………………………………………………………… 4-1
Guides to Effective Execution ……………………………………………………………………….. 4-1
Responsibilities During Execution ………………………………………………………………….. 4-4
Execution Activities ………………………………………………………………………………………. 4-5
Rapid Decision-Making and Synchronization Process ………………………………………. 4-9

Chapter 5 ASSESSMENT ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 5-1
Fundamentals of Assessment ……………………………………………………………………….. 5-1
Assessment Activities …………………………………………………………………………………… 5-2

Contents

ii ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

Assessment Process……………………………………………………………………………………. 5-4
Guides to Effective Assessment ……………………………………………………………………. 5-6
SOURCE NOTES ……………………………………………………………………. Source Notes-1
GLOSSARY …………………………………………………………………………………… Glossary-1
REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………………. References-1
INDEX ………………………………………………………………………………………………… Index-1

Figures

Introduction figure-1. Operations process logic chart …………………………………………………………….. vi
Figure 1-1. The operations process ………………………………………………………………………………….. 1-4
Figure 1-2. The commander’s role in the operations process ………………………………………………. 1-8
Figure 1-3. Commander’s visualization …………………………………………………………………………….. 1-9
Figure 2-1. Levels of warfare …………………………………………………………………………………………… 2-9
Figure 2-2. Sample line of operations and line of effort ……………………………………………………… 2-13
Figure 2-3. Integrated planning ………………………………………………………………………………………. 2-16
Figure 2-4. Activities of Army design methodology …………………………………………………………… 2-17
Figure 3-1. Transition among the integrating cells ……………………………………………………………… 3-8
Figure 4-1. Risk reduction factors …………………………………………………………………………………….. 4-3
Figure 4-2. Decision making during execution……………………………………………………………………. 4-6
Figure 4-3. Rapid decision-making and synchronization process …………………………………………. 4-9
Figure 5-1. Activities of assessment …………………………………………………………………………………. 5-2

Tables

Introduction table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms………………………………………………. vii
Table 3-1. Preparation activities ………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-4
Table 4-1. Decision types and related actions ……………………………………………………………………. 4-7

Vignettes

Agility: Rapidly Turning the Third Army to Bastogne ………………………………………………………….. 1-5
Collaboration: Meade’s Council of War …………………………………………………………………………… 1-14
Tenets in Action: OPERATION JUST CAUSE …………………………………………………………………. 2-22
Prepare: Rangers Train for Seizing Pointe du Hoc …………………………………………………………….. 3-3
Large-Unit Preparation: Third Army Readies for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ………………….. 3-9
Decision Making During Execution: Chamberlain at Little Round Top …………………………………… 4-8
Measures of Effectiveness: OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE ……………………………………………….. 5-4
Commander’s Assessment: Are We Ready To Close on Baghdad ………………………………………. 5-7

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 iii

Preface

ADP 5-0 provides doctrine on the operations process. It describes fundamentals for effective planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing operations. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs,
employ the operations process to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and lead forces to
mission accomplishment.

To comprehend doctrine contained in ADP 5-0, readers should first understand the fundamentals of unified
land operations described in ADP 3-0. As the operations process is the framework for the exercise of
command and control, readers should also understand the fundamentals of command and control and mission
command described in ADP 6-0. Readers must also understand how the Army ethic guides decision making
throughout the operations process (see Army doctrine on the Army profession).

Several publications support ADP 5-0. For detailed tactics and procedures associated with the operations
process, such as the duties and responsibilities of the staff, how to conduct the military decision-making
process, and formats for plans and orders, readers should refer to FM 6-0. Techniques for organizing
command posts and command post operations is located in ATP 6-0.5. Techniques for employing the Army
design methodology is located in ATP 5-0.1. Techniques for assessing operations is located in ATP 5-0.3.

The principal audience for ADP 5-0 is Army commanders, leaders, and unit staffs. This publication also
provides the foundation for Army training and education curricula on the operations process. Commanders
and staffs of Army headquarters that require joint capabilities or form the core of a joint task force, joint land
component, or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine. This
includes JP 3-16, JP 3-31, and JP 3-33.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States, international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure
that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ADP 5-0 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreement 2199, Command and
Control of Allied Land Forces. ADP 5-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms
and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 5-0 is the proponent
publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. When first defined in the text,
terms for which ADP 5-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced and italicized, and definitions are
boldfaced. When first defining other proponent definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number
of the proponent publication follows the definition. Following uses of the term are not italicized.

ADP 5-0 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States,
and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 5-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and
recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD
(ADP 5-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

iv ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

Acknowledgements

The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from
their works. The Source Notes lists other sources of quotations and research.

War as I Knew It by General George S. Patton. Copyright © 1947 by Beatrice Patton Walters, Ruth
Patton Totten, and George Smith Totten. Copyright © renewed 1975 by MG George Patton,
Ruth Patton Totten, John K. Waters, Jr., and George P. Waters. Reprinted by permission of
Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

1958 by Bernard Law Montgomery. Reprinted by permission of The World Publishing
Company.

Quote reprinted courtesy William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman. Copyright
© 2000 by Penguin Books.

Quote reprinted courtesy Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in
Burma and India, 1942–1945. Copyright © 1956 by Viscount William Slim. Copyright ©
renewed 2000 by Copper Square Press.

Company.
Quote reprinted courtesy Antoine Henri de Jomini, Art of War, translated by G.H. Mendell and W.P.

Craighill. Copyright © 1862 by J.B. Lippincott & Co. Online by The Internet Archive.
Available at https://archive.org/details/artwar00mendgoog.

Quote reprinted courtesy of The American Presidency Project. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley. Available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233951.

Quote reprinted courtesy Owen Connolly, On War and Leadership. Copyright © 2002 by Princeton
University Press.

Quotes reprinted courtesy Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, compiled by Robert Debs
Heinl, Jr. Copyright © 1967 by United States Naval Institute.

Paraphrased courtesy JoAnna M. McDonald, The Liberation of Pointe du Hoc: the 2nd U.S. Rangers
at Normandy. Copyright © 2000 by Rank and File Publications.

Quote reprinted courtesy Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945. Copyright 1974
by Martin Blumenson. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights
reserved.

by Harcourt, Brace, and Company.
Quote reprinted courtesy Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 v

Introduction

Military operations are human endeavors conducted in dynamic and uncertain operational environments to
achieve a political purpose. Army forces, as part of a joint team, conduct unified land operations to shape
operational environments, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and contribute to winning the Nation’s wars.
During periods of competition or armed conflict, command and control—the exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander—is fundamental to all operations. Based on the Army’s vision
of war and nature of operations, mission command is the Army’s approach for exercising command and
control. The mission command approach empowers subordinate decision making and emphasizes
decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

The Army’s framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations process.
The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during operations
(planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing). Commanders, supported by their staffs, employ
the operations process to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environments, end state, and
operational approach; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations as
shown in introduction figure-1 on page vi.

The Army continuously prepares for large-scale ground combat while simultaneously shaping the security
environment around the world. ADP 5-0 provides doctrine for how Army forces conduct the operations
process across the range of military operations. It describes a mission command approach to planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing operations. This revised ADP 5-0—

Combines the 2012 editions of ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0 into one publication.
Incorporates updated tactics on Army operations to include an emphasis on large-scale combat
operations described in the 2017 edition of FM 3-0.
Incorporates updated fundamentals of mission command to include the reintroduction of command
and control to Army doctrine described in the 2019 edition of ADP 6-0.
Incorporates updated doctrine on assessment described in the 2017 edition of JP 5-0.
Removes the detailed discussion of Army design methodology (now found in ATP 5-0.1).
Removes the discussion of continuing activities as they are similar to the responsibilities of units
assigned an area of operations.

ADP 5-0 contains five chapters:

Chapter 1 sets the context for conducting the operations process by describing the nature of operations,
unified land operations, and mission command. Next, it defines and describes the operations process. A
discussion of the principles of the operations process follows. The chapter concludes with discussions of the
integrating processes and battle rhythm.

Chapter 2 defines planning and describes the functions of planning and plans. It discusses planning at the
levels of warfare, operational art, integrated planning, and key components of a plan. The chapter concludes
with guides for effective planning and planning pitfalls to avoid.

Chapter 3 addresses the fundamentals of preparation to include its definition and functions. It offers guides
for effective preparation and addresses specific preparation activities commonly performed within the
headquarters and across the force to improve the unit’s ability to execute operations.

Chapter 4 defines, describes, and offers guides for effective execution. It describes the role of the
commander and the role of the staff during execution followed by a discussion of the major activities of
execution. It concludes with a discussion of the rapid decision-making and synchronization process.

Chapter 5 defines and describes assessment. It discusses an assessment model and offers guides for effective
assessment.

Introduction

vi ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

Introduction figure-1. Operations process logic chart

Introduction table-1 lists terms that have been added, rescinded, or modified for which ADP 5-0 is the
proponent publication for the term. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms.

Introduction

2019 ADP 5-0 vii

Introduction table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms

Term Reasoning
Army design methodology Modifies for clarity.
civil considerations ADP 6-0 becomes proponent.
collaborative planning ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition.
commander’s visualization ADP 6-0 becomes proponent.
concept of operations ADP 5-0 becomes proponent.
confirmation brief ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition.
decision support matrix ADP 5-0 becomes proponent.
direct support FM 3-0 becomes proponent for the Army term.
essential element of friendly information ADP 6-0 becomes proponent.
evaluating ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition.
execution Modifies for clarity.
execution matrix ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition.
general support-reinforcing FM 3-0 becomes proponent.
indicator Army definition is no longer used. Adopts joint definition.
key tasks ADP 6-0 becomes proponent.
military decision-making process Modifies term for grammar.
monitoring ADP 5-0 becomes proponent.
nested concepts ADP 5-0 becomes proponent.
operations process Modifies for clarity.
parallel planning ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition.
planning Modifies for clarity.
planning horizon ADP 5-0 becomes proponent.
priority of support ADP 5-0 becomes proponent.
rehearsal ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition.
reinforcing FM 3-0 becomes proponent.
situational understanding ADP 6-0 becomes proponent.
task organization ADP 5-0 becomes proponent.
terrain management ADP 3-90 becomes proponent.

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31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 1-1

Chapter 1

Fundamentals of the Operations Process

The best is the enemy of good. By this I mean that a good plan violently executed now is
better than a perfect plan next week.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

This chapter sets the contexts for conducting the operations process by describing the
nature of operations, unified land operations, and mission command. Next, it defines
and describes the operations process. A discussion of the principles of the operations
process follows. The chapter concludes with discussions of the integrating processes
and battle rhythm.

THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS
1-1. Understanding the doctrine on mission command and the operations process requires an appreciation
of the nature of operations and the Army’s vision of war. It is upon this appreciation that mission command—
an approach to the exercise of command and control—is built. The principles of mission command guide
commanders and staffs in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations.

1-2. Military operations fall along a competition continuum that spans cooperation to war. Between these
extremes, societies maintain relationships. These relationships include economic competition, political or
ideological tension, and at times armed conflict. Violent power struggles in failed states, along with the
emergence of major regional powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea seeking to gain strategic
positions of advantage, present challenges to the joint force. Army forces must be prepared to meet these
challenges across the range of military operations during periods of competition and war.

1-3. The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and
operations in scope and purpose within a backdrop of the competition continuum. The potential range of
military operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in periods of
competition to large-scale combat operations in periods of war. Whether fighting terrorists as part of a limited
contingency operation or defeating a peer threat in large-scale combat, the nature of operations is constant.
Military operations are—

Human endeavors.
Conducted in dynamic and uncertain environments.
Designed to achieve a political purpose.

HUMAN ENDEAVORS
1-4. Military operations are human endeavors—a contest of wills characterized by violence and continuous
adaptation among all participants. Fundamentally, all war is about changing human behavior. During
operations, Army forces face thinking and adaptive enemies, differing agendas of various actors, and
changing perceptions of civilians in an operational area. The enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted
upon but an independent and active force with its own objectives. As friendly forces try to impose their will
on the enemy, the enemy resists and seeks to impose its will on friendly forces. A similar dynamic occurs
among civilian groups whose own desires influence and are influenced by military operations. Appreciating
these relationships among opposing human wills is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of
operations.

Chapter 1

1-2 ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

DYNAMIC AND UNCERTAIN
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties
accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has
experienced war.

Carl von Clausewitz

1-5. War is inherently dynamic and uncertain. The complexity of friendly and enemy organizations, unique
combinations of terrain and weather, and the dynamic interaction among all participants create uncertainty.
Chance and friction increase the potential for chaos and uncertainty during operations. Chance pertains to
unexpected events or changes beyond the control of friendly forces, while friction describes obstacles that
make executing even simple tasks difficult. Both are always present for all sides during combat.

1-6. The scale, scope, tempo, and lethality of large-scale ground combat exacerbates the dynamic and
uncertain nature of war, making precise cause-and-effect determinations difficult or delayed. The unintended
effects of operations often cannot be anticipated and may not be readily apparent during execution. Disorder
is an inherent characteristic of war. This demands an approach to the conduct of operations that does not
attempt to impose perfect order on operations but rather makes allowances for friction and uncertainty.

ACHIEVE POLITICAL PURPOSE
Thus any study of the problem ought to begin and end with the question of policy.

Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart

1-7. All U.S. military operations share a common fundamental purpose—to achieve or contribute to
national objectives. Objective—to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable goal—is a principle of war. This principle reinforces the proper relationship between military
operations and policy. Military operations must always be subordinate to policy and serve as a way to a
political end.

1-8. In large-scale combat, the purpose of operations may be to destroy the enemy’s capabilities and will
to fight. The purpose of operations short of large-scale combat may be more nuanced and broad, and
subsequently, may require support to multiple objectives. These operations frequently involve setting
conditions that improve positions of relative advantage compared to that of a specific adversary and that
contribute to achieving strategic aims in an operational area. In either case, all operations are designed to
achieve the political purpose set by national authorities.

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
1-9. The Army’s operational concept—the central idea that guides the conduct of Army operations—is
unified land operations. Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability,
and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent
conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0).
Army forces do this with combined arms formations possessing the mobility, firepower, protection, and
sustainment to defeat an enemy and establish control of areas, resources, and populations. Army forces
depend on the capabilities of the other Services as the joint force depends on Army capabilities across
multiple domains. The goal of unified land operations is to achieve the joint force commander’s end state by
applying land power as part of unified action. During the conduct of unified land operations, Army forces
support the joint force through four strategic roles:

Shape operational environments (OEs).
Prevent conflict.
Prevail in large-scale ground combat.
Consolidate gains.

1-10. Army forces assist in shaping an OE by providing trained and ready forces to geographic combatant
commanders (GCCs) in support of their campaign plan. Shaping activities include security cooperation,
military engagement, and forward presence to promote U.S. interests and assure allies. Army operations to

Fundamentals of the Operations Process

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 1-3

prevent are designed to deter undesirable actions of an adversary through positioning of friendly capabilities
and demonstrating the will to use them. Army forces may have a significant role in the execution of flexible
deterrent options or flexible response options. Additionally, Army prevent activities may include
mobilization, force tailoring, and other pre-deployment activities; initial deployment into a theater of
operations; and development of intelligence, communications, sustainment, and protection infrastructure to
support the joint force commander. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat
of enemy ground forces. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, exploit success, and break their
opponent’s will to resist. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains
become the focus of operations after large-scale combat operations have concluded. (See ADP 3-0 for a
detailed discussion of unified land operations.)

MISSION COMMAND
Diverse are the situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of
the situation. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can
be given. But most productive are his actions when he acts within the framework of his
senior commander’s intent.

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke

1-11. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the …

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site
(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

*ADP 3-0

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes ADP 3-0, dated 6 October 2017, and ADRP 3-0, dated 6 October 2017.

ADP 3-0 i

Army Doctrine Publication
No. 3-0

Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 31 July 2019

Operations
Contents

Page

Chapter 1 MILITARY OPERATIONS …………………………………………………………………………….. 1-1
An Operational Environment …………………………………………………………………………. 1-1
War as a Human Endeavor …………………………………………………………………………… 1-4
Army Strategic Roles ……………………………………………………………………………………. 1-5
Unified Action ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1-6
Land Operations ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1-9
Seize, Retain, and Exploit the Operational Initiative ……………………………………….. 1-11
Readiness Through Training ……………………………………………………………………….. 1-12

Chapter 2 OPERATIONAL ART …………………………………………………………………………………… 2-1
The Application of Operational Art …………………………………………………………………. 2-1
Defeat and Stability Mechanisms …………………………………………………………………… 2-4
The Elements of Operational Art ……………………………………………………………………. 2-5

Chapter 3 THE ARMY’S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT …………………………………………………….. 3-1
Unified Land Operations ……………………………………………………………………………….. 3-1
Decisive Action ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-1
Consolidate Gains ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 3-5
Activities to Consolidate Gains ………………………………………………………………………. 3-6
Principles of Unified Land Operations …………………………………………………………….. 3-7
Tenets of Unified Land Operations ……………………………………………………………….. 3-12
Successful Execution of Unified Land Operations ………………………………………….. 3-13

Chapter 4 OPERATIONS STRUCTURE………………………………………………………………………… 4-1
Construct for Operations Structure …………………………………………………………………. 4-1
Operations Process ……………………………………………………………………………………… 4-1
Combat Power …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4-2
Army Operational Framework………………………………………………………………………… 4-2

Chapter 5 COMBAT POWER ………………………………………………………………………………………. 5-1
The Elements of Combat Power ……………………………………………………………………. 5-1
The Six Warfighting Functions……………………………………………………………………….. 5-2
Organizing Combat Power ……………………………………………………………………………. 5-7

Appendix A COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS …………………………………………….. A-1
GLOSSARY …………………………………………………………………………………… Glossary-1

Contents

ii ADP 3-0 31 July 2019

REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………………. References-1
INDEX ………………………………………………………………………………………………… Index-1

Figures

Introductory figure. ADP 3-0 unified logic chart …………………………………………………………………….. vi
Figure 2-1. Army design methodology ………………………………………………………………………………. 2-3
Figure 2-2. Operational approach …………………………………………………………………………………….. 2-4
Figure 3-1. Decisive action ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3-3
Figure 5-1. The elements of combat power ……………………………………………………………………….. 5-1
Figure 5-2. Command and control warfighting function ……………………………………………………….. 5-3
Figure A-1. Chain of command branches ………………………………………………………………………….. A-2
Figure A-2. Joint task force organization options ……………………………………………………………….. A-4
Figure A-3. Example of a joint task force showing an Army corps as joint force land component

commander with ARFOR responsibilities …………………………………………………………. A-5

Tables

Introductory table 1. New, modified, and rescinded Army terms …………………………………………….. vii
Table 2-1. Principles of joint operations …………………………………………………………………………….. 2-1
Table 2-2. Elements of operational art ………………………………………………………………………………. 2-6
Table 3-1. Elements of decisive action ……………………………………………………………………………… 3-2
Table 3-2. Consolidate gains by echelon …………………………………………………………………………… 3-6
Table 3-3. The Soldier’s Rules ………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-11
Table A-1. Joint support categories ………………………………………………………………………………….. A-7
Table A-2. Command relationships ………………………………………………………………………………… A-10
Table A-3. Army support relationships …………………………………………………………………………….. A-11
Table A-4. Other relationships ……………………………………………………………………………………….. A-12

31 July 2019 ADP 3-0 iii

Preface

ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army’s view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across
multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and
procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army’s operational doctrine for
unified land operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military
operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army
education system curricula related to unified land operations.

The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of
Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to
applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or
multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure
that their Service members operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See
FM 27-10.)

ADP 3-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 3-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with
an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ADP 3-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in
the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent
publication follows the definition.

ADP 3-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 3-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and
recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD
(ADP 3-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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31 July 2019 ADP 3-0 v

Introduction

ADP 3-0 describes how the Army conducts operations as a unified action partner using the Army’s
operational concept—a fundamental statement that frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint
force, conduct operations (ADP 1-01). The Army’s operational concept is unified land operations. ADP 3-0
discusses the foundations, tenets, and doctrine of unified land operations, which serves as a common
reference for solving military problems in multiple domains and the framework for the range of military
operations across the competition continuum. It is the core of Army doctrine, and it guides how Army forces
contribute to unified action. (See the introductory figure on page vi for the ADP 3-0 logic chart.)

ADP 3-0 lists key ideas, such as principles and tenets, as a means of organizing ways to think about military
problem solving. A narrative discussion follows each list to provide explanation and context about the
subject. The proper application of principles and tenets to a particular situation requires situational
understanding informed by professional judgment. Like all doctrine, ADP 3-0 provides a common approach
to problem solving, not a list of solutions that can substitute for thinking by commanders and staffs.

ADP 3-0 modifies key topics and updates terminology and concepts as necessary. These topics include the
discussion of an operational environment and the operational and mission variables, as well as discussions
of unified action, law of land warfare, and combat power. ADP 3-0 maintains combined arms as the
application of arms that multiplies Army forces’ effectiveness in all operations. However, it expands
combined arms to include joint and multinational capabilities as integral to combined arms and discusses
how the Army conducts these operations across multiple domains. (For more detailed information on specific
tactics and procedures, see FM 3-0.)

ADP 3-0 contains five chapters and one appendix:

Chapter 1 defines military operations, in context, for the Army. It describes the variables that shape the
nature of an operational environment and affect outcomes. It provides explanation of unified action and joint
operations as well as land operations and the Army’s four strategic roles. Finally, it discusses the importance
of training to gain skill in land warfare.

Chapter 2 is a discussion on the application of operational art. It details how commanders should consider
defeat and stability mechanisms when developing an operational approach. It presents the elements of
operational art and describes their meaning.

Chapter 3 addresses the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations. It describes how
commanders will likely apply landpower as part of unified action to defeat enemy forces on land and establish
conditions that accomplish the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives. Chapter 3 defines the principles
and tenets of unified land operations.

Chapter 4 provides the operations structure commanders use to array forces and conduct operations. It also
includes the operational framework used in the conduct of unified land operations.

Chapter 5 defines combat power. It discusses the elements of combat power and describes the six
warfighting functions used to generate combat power. Lastly, it discusses how Army forces organize combat
power through force tailoring, task organization, and mutual support.

Appendix A addresses command and support relationships. It describes these as the basis for unity of
command and unity of effort in operations. It details how command relationships and authorities affect Army
force generation, force tailoring, and task organization. It further discusses how commanders use Army
support relationships when task-organizing Army forces.

Introduction

vi ADP 3-0 31 July 2019

Introductory figure. ADP 3-0 unified logic chart

Introduction

31 July 2019 ADP 3-0 vii

Certain terms for which ADP 3-0 is the proponent have been added, rescinded, or modified. The glossary
contains acronyms and defined terms. (See introductory table 1 for new, modified, and rescinded Army
terms.)

Introductory table 1. New, modified, and rescinded Army terms

Term Reasoning
close area ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
close combat ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
combat power ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
combined arms ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
command and control
warfighting function

ADP 3-0 creates new term and definition.

consolidate gains ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
consolidation area ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
cyberspace electromagnetic
activities

ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.

decisive action ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified
for clarity.

decisive operation ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
deep area ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
defeat ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
defeat mechanism ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
defensive operation ADP 3-0 creates new term and definition.
defensive task No longer a defined term.
depth ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
disintegrate ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
dislocate ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
enemy ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
exterior lines ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
fires warfighting function ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
flexibility ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
force tailoring ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
hybrid threat ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
intelligence warfighting function ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
interior lines ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
isolate ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
landpower ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
large-scale ground combat ADP 3-0 creates new term and definition.
large-scale ground combat
operations

ADP 3-0 creates new term and definition.

line of effort ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.

Introduction

viii ADP 3-0 31 July 2019

Introductory table 1. New, modified, and rescinded Army terms (continued)

Term Reasoning
line of operations ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
main effort ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
maneuver ADP 3-0 creates new Army definition.
mission command warfighting
function

Rescinded.

movement and maneuver
warfighting function

ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.

offensive operation ADP 3-0 creates new term and definition.
offensive task No longer a defined term.
operational initiative ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
phase ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
position of relative advantage ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
protection warfighting function ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
shaping operation ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
simultaneity ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
stability mechanism ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
stability operation ADP 3-0 creates new term and definition.
support area ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
supporting distance ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
supporting effort ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
supporting range ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
sustaining operation ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
sustainment warfighting function ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
task-organizing ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
tempo ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
threat ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
unified action partners ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.
unified land operations ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term. Modified

for clarity.
warfighting function ADP 3-0 is now the proponent of the term.

31 July 2019 ADP 3-0 1-1

Chapter 1

Military Operations

This chapter discusses military operations, their relationship to operational
environments, and the threats that exist within them. The chapter then discusses the
Army’s strategic roles in the context of unified action and joint operations. Lastly, this
chapter discusses land operations and training readiness.

AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect
the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders at all
levels have their own operational environments for their particular operations. An operational environment
for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist within a specific physical
area. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics
and economics) that impact on conditions and operations there. Thus, each commander’s operational
environment is part of a higher echelon commander’s operational environment.

1-2. Operational environments include considerations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
warfare. At the strategic level, leaders develop an idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of
national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in a synchronized and integrated fashion
to accomplish national objectives. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national
and military strategic objectives, with the focus being on the design, planning, and conduct of operations
using operational art. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of operational art.) The tactical level of warfare involves
the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. The levels of warfare help
commanders visualize a logical arrangement of forces, allocate resources, and assign tasks based on a
strategic purpose, informed by the conditions within their operational environments.

1-3. Broad trends such as globalization, urbanization, technological advances, and failing states affect land
operations. These trends can create instability and contribute to an environment of persistent competition and
conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors willing
to use violence to achieve political and ideological ends. In such an operational environment, commanders
must seek and exploit opportunities for success. To exploit opportunities, commanders must thoroughly
understand the dynamic nature of their operational environment. Previous experience within a similar
operational environment is not enough to guarantee future mission success in the current one.

1-4. Threats seek to employ capabilities to create effects in multiple domains and the information
environment to counter U.S. interests and impede friendly operations. Their activities in the information
environment, space, and cyberspace attempt to influence U.S. decision makers and disrupt friendly
deployment of forces. Land-based threats will attempt to impede joint force freedom of action across the air,
land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. They will disrupt the electromagnetic spectrum, sow
confusion in the information environment, and challenge the legitimacy of U.S. actions. Understanding how
threats can present multiple dilemmas to Army forces in all domains helps Army commanders identify (or
create), seize, and exploit their own opportunities.

1-5. Some peer threats have nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities and the ability to employ such
weapons in certain situations. However, capability does not always equal intent to use, and it is generally
presumed that most would use restraint. Preparation and planning that takes nuclear and chemical weapons
capabilities into account is of paramount importance in any confrontation with an adversary armed with them.
Understanding threat nuclear and chemical weapons doctrine is important, particularly during large-scale
ground combat operations.

Chapter 1

1-2 ADP 3-0 31 July 2019

1-6. Nuclear terrorism remains a threat to the United States and to international security and stability.
Preventing the illicit acquisition of a nuclear weapon, nuclear materials, or related technology and expertise
by a violent extremist organization is a significant U.S. national security priority. The more states—
particularly rogue states—that possess nuclear weapons or the materials, technology, and knowledge required
to make them, the greater the potential risk of terrorist acquisition. Given the nature of terrorist ideologies,
commanders and staffs must assume that terrorists would employ a nuclear weapon were they to acquire one.

1-7. Large-scale ground combat operations can occur below the nuclear threshold, and they are not
synonymous with total war. Large-scale ground combat operations are sustained combat operations
involving multiple corps and divisions. Planning for large-scale ground combat operations against enemies
possessing nuclear weapons must account for the possibility of their use against friendly forces. The
operational approaches employed by joint force commanders (JFCs) may thus be constrained to avoid nuclear
escalation in terms of their geographic depth and the assigned objectives. Large-scale ground combat
operations, while potentially enormous in scale and scope, are typically limited by the law of war and the
political objectives of the conflict itself. Against nuclear armed enemies, the political objectives of a conflict
are also informed by the strategic risk inherent in escalation. While the scale and scope of conventional
conflict has been smaller than World War II since 1945, it retains its inherent lethality and complexity.

1-8. Successful operations against nuclear and chemically capable peer threats require units prepared to
react to the employment of those capabilities and operate degraded in contaminated environments. Planning
and training must include active and passive measures for protection against the effects of these weapons, as
well as techniques for mitigating their effects to preserve combat power. This includes greater emphasis on
dispersion, survivability, and regenerating communications between echelons. These requirements must be
incorporated into every facet of doctrine and training, so units and commanders are technically and
psychologically prepared for the environment they may encounter. Survivability in this environment should
be a training and readiness objective.

1-9. Modern information technology makes the information environment, which includes cyberspace and
the electromagnetic spectrum, indispensable to military operations. The information environment is the
aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information
(JP 3-13). It is a key part of any operational environment, and it will be simultaneously congested and
contested during operations. All actors in the information environment—enemy, friendly, or neutral—remain
vulnerable to attack by physical, psychological, cyber, or electronic means. (See JP 3-12 for more information
on cyberspace operations and the electromagnetic spectrum.)

1-10. No two operational environments are the same. An operational environment consists of many
relationships and interactions among interrelated variables. How entities and conditions interact within an
operational environment is often difficult to understand and requires continuous analysis. (See paragraphs
1-13 through 1-15 for a discussion of the operational and mission variables.)

1-11. An operational environment continually evolves because of the complexity of human interaction and
how people learn and adapt. People’s actions change that environment. Some changes can be anticipated,
while others cannot. Some changes are immediate and apparent, while other changes evolve over time or are
extremely difficult to detect.

1-12. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship
between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the friction and uncertainty inherent in military
operations. Commanders must continually assess their operational environments and re-assess their
assumptions. Commanders and staffs use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission
variables to analyze an operational environment to support the operations process. (See paragraphs 4-7
through 4-8 for a discussion of the Army design methodology.)

OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES
1-13. An operational environment evolves as each operation progresses. Army leaders use operational
variables to analyze and understand a specific operational environment, and they use mission variables to
focus on specific elements during mission analysis. (See appendix A to FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of
operational and mission variables.)

Military Operations

31 July 2019 ADP 3-0 1-3

Operational Variables
1-14. Army planners describe conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables.
Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that
may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only
the military aspects of an operational environment, but also the population’s influence on it. Using Army
design methodology, planners analyze an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational
variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time
(known as PMESII-PT). As soon as a commander and staff have an indication of where their unit will conduct
operations, they begin analyzing the operational variables associated with that location. They continue to
refine and update that analysis throughout the course of operations.

Mission Variables
1-15. Upon receipt of an order, Army leaders filter information from operational variables into mission
variables during mission analysis. They use the mission variables to refine their understanding of the
situation. The mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables
with METT-TC ensures that Army leaders consider the best available information about the mission.

THREATS AND HAZARDS
1-16. For every operation, threats are a fundamental part of an operational environment. A threat is any
combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States
forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, organized or
unorganized groups, paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. Commanders and
staffs must understand how current and potential threats organize, equip, train, employ, and control their
forces. They must continually identify, monitor, and assess threats as they adapt and change over time.

1-17. In general, the various actors in any operational area can qualify as an enemy, an adversary, a neutral,
or a friend. An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. An
enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war. …

7/24/2020 SMC-DL Phase 1 Class 47-A

https://usasma.blackboard.com/webapps/rubric/do/course/manageRubrics?dispatch=view&context=course&rubricId=_18337_1&course_id=_10998_1 1/2

Copy of 1009W-DL Special (Short answer Essay Rubric)

This rubric is for the short answer essay (written in Blackboard)in Module 2 for all departments.
(AJ)

Levels of Achievement

Criteria Far ExceededStandard
Exceeded
Standard Met Standard

Did Not Meet
Standard Unsatisfactory

Content 25 Points
Demonstrates
mastery
covering all key
elements of the
question in a
substantive
way.

21.5 Points
Demonstrates
considerable
proficiency
covering all key
elements of the
question in a
substantive
way.

17.5 Points
Demonstrates
partial
proficiency
covering all key
elements of the
question in a
substantive
way

6 Points
Demonstrates
limited or poor
proficiency
covering all key
elements of the
question in a
substantive
way.

0 Points
Failed to
provide an
answer

Written
Communication

25 Points
Demonstrates
mastery and
proficiency in
written
communication
and use of
appropriate
and relevant
terminology at
the Command
level. Mastery
of APA writing
standards.

21.5 Points
Explains
concepts and
theories using
most correct
terminology
associated with
question

17.5 Points
“Demonstrates
limited
proficiency in
written
communication
and use of
appropriate
and relevant
terminology at
the Command
level. Five or
more APA
errors and
does not apply
sound writing
principles.

6 Points
Demonstrates
limited or poor
proficiency in
written
communication
and use of
appropriate
and relevant
terminology at
the Command
level.

0 Points
Failed to
provide an
answer

Logic 25 Points
Fully states
and explains
the key
concepts
related to the
question using
all associated
correct
terminology

21.5 Points
Explains
concepts and
theories using
most correct
terminology
associated with
question

17.5 Points
Explains
concepts and
theories using
some correct
terminology
(Does not
incorporate
terminology
into response
only provide
doctrinal
definition)

6 Points
There is no
example
provided to
support the
answer or the
example
provided is
irrelevant

0 Points
Failed to
provide an
answer

Name

Description

Rubric Detail

7/24/2020 SMC-DL Phase 1 Class 47-A

https://usasma.blackboard.com/webapps/rubric/do/course/manageRubrics?dispatch=view&context=course&rubricId=_18337_1&course_id=_10998_1 2/2

Levels of Achievement

Criteria Far ExceededStandard
Exceeded
Standard Met Standard

Did Not Meet
Standard Unsatisfactory

Reasoning 25 Points
Demonstrates
mastery
conceptualizing
the problem,
and analyzing
information.
Conclusions
are logically
presented and
applied to
professional
practice in an
exceptional
manner.

20.5 Points
Demonstrates
considerable
proficiency
conceptualizing
the problem,
and analyzing
information.
Conclusions
are logically
presented and
applied to
professional
practice in an
adequate
manner.

17.5 Points
Demonstrates
partial
proficiency in
conceptualizing
the problem,
and analyzing
information.
Conclusions
are logically
presented and
applied to
professional
practice in a
limited manner.

6 Points
Demonstrates
limited or poor
proficiency in
conceptualizing
the problem
and analyzing
information.
Conclusions
are poorly
conceived and
presented, and
there is no
application to
professional
practice.

0 Points
Failed to
provide an
answer

New Row5 0 Points 0 Points 0 Points -10 Points
Deduct 10
points for every
48 hours late.

0 Points

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FM 6-0
COMMANDER AND STAFF

ORGANIZATION AND
OPERATIONS

MAY 2014
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication supersedes ATTP 5-01.1, dated 14 September 2011.

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(https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html).
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http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp.

Change No. 2
FM 6-0, C2

Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, DC, April 2016

Commander and Staff Organization and Operations
1. Change 2 to FM 6-0, 5 May 2014, updates discussion of evaluation criteria, corrects errors in how to

weight evaluation criteria, and makes administrative changes.

2. A left-pointing triangle (◄) marks new content material.

3. FM 6-0, 5 May 2014, is changed as follows:

Remove Old Pages Insert New Pages

pages 9-1 through 9-46 pages 9-1 through 9-46

pages References-1 through References-4 pages References-1 through References-4

4. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

DISTRUBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army
1610404

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: istributed in

116056 FM 6-0

PIN: 104216-002

FM 6-0, C1
Change No. 1 Headquarters

Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 11 May 2015

Commander and Staff Organization and
Operations

1. Change 1 to FM 6-0, 5 March 2014, adds the supersession statement to the cover.

2. Modifies figure 7-2.

3. Modifies figure 9-5.

4. Adds joint command relationships to appendix B.

5. Modifies table B-2.

6. Modifies table B-3.

7. Adds definitions of close support, direct liaison authorized, direct support, and mutual support.

8. A number sign (+) marks new material.

9. FM 6-0, 5 May 2014, is changed as follows:

Remove Old Pages Insert New Pages

front cover front cover

inside front cover (AKO page) inside front cover (AKO page)

pages i through vi pages i through vi

pages 7-1 through 7-2 pages 7-1 through 7-2

pages 9-23 through 9-45 pages 9-23 through 9-46

pages B-1 through B-5 pages B-1 through B-7 and blank page

pages Glossary-1 through Glossary-9 pages Glossary-1 through Glossary-9 and blank
page

pages Index-1 through Index-9 pages Index-1 through Index-9 and blank page

10. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

DISTRUBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army
1

*FM 6-0

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes ATTP 5-01.1, dated 14 September 2011.

11 May 2015 FM 6-0, C1 i

Field Manual
No. 6-0

Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 5 May 2014

Commander and Staff Organization and Operations

Contents
Page

PREFACE……………………………………………………………………………………………….. vi
INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………………………….. vii
Chapter 1 COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS …………………………. 1-1

Command Post Organization ………………………………………………………………….. 1-1
Command Post Organization Considerations ……………………………………………. 1-3
Command Post Cells, Staff Sections, and Elements ………………………………….. 1-5
Command Post Operations …………………………………………………………………….. 1-8

Chapter 2 STAFF DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ……………………………………………… 2-1
Primary Staff Responsibilities ………………………………………………………………….. 2-1
Common Staff Duties and Responsiblities ………………………………………………… 2-2
Staff Characteristics ………………………………………………………………………………. 2-2
Staff Relationships …………………………………………………………………………………. 2-3
Staff Organization ………………………………………………………………………………….. 2-4
Coordinating Staff Officers ……………………………………………………………………… 2-6
Special Staff Officers ……………………………………………………………………………. 2-16
Personal Staff Officers ………………………………………………………………………….. 2-26

Chapter 3 MANAGING KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION ……………………………………. 3-1
Knowledge and Understanding ……………………………………………………………….. 3-1
Knowledge Management ………………………………………………………………………… 3-2
Information Management………………………………………………………………………… 3-6
Knowledge and Information Management in Practice ……………………………….. 3-10

Chapter 4 PROBLEM SOLVING ……………………………………………………………………………. 4-1
Problems………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4-1
The Problem Solving Process …………………………………………………………………. 4-1
Identify the Problem ……………………………………………………………………………….. 4-3
Develop Criteria …………………………………………………………………………………….. 4-3
Generate Possible Solutions …………………………………………………………………… 4-5

Contents

ii FM 6-0, C1 11 May 2015

Analyze Possible Solutions ……………………………………………………………………… 4-6
Compare Possible Solutions ……………………………………………………………………. 4-6
Make and Implement the Decision ……………………………………………………………. 4-6

Chapter 5 STAFF STUDIES …………………………………………………………………………………… 5-1
Developing Staff Studies …………………………………………………………………………. 5-1
Coordinating Staff Studies ………………………………………………………………………. 5-4
Common Problems with Staff Studies ………………………………………………………. 5-5

Chapter 6 DECISION PAPERS ………………………………………………………………………………. 6-1
Preparing Decision Papers ……………………………………………………………………… 6-1
Formatting Decision Papers …………………………………………………………………….. 6-1

Chapter 7 MILITARY BRIEFINGS ………………………………………………………………………….. 7-1
Types of Military Briefings ……………………………………………………………………….. 7-1
Steps of Military Briefings ……………………………………………………………………….. 7-3

Chapter 8 RUNNING ESTIMATES ………………………………………………………………………….. 8-1
Types of Running Estimates ……………………………………………………………………. 8-1
Essential Qualities of Running Estimates ………………………………………………….. 8-1
Running Estimates in the Operations Process …………………………………………… 8-2

Chapter 9 THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS ……………………………………….. 9-1
Characteristics of the Military Decisionmaking Process ………………………………. 9-1
Steps of the Military Decisionmaking Process ……………………………………………. 9-4
Planning in a Time-Constrained Environment ………………………………………….. 9-44

Chapter 10 TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES ………………………………………………………… 10-1
Background and Comparison to the MDMP …………………………………………….. 10-1
Steps of Troop Leading Procedures ……………………………………………………….. 10-3

Chapter 11 MILITARY DECEPTION ……………………………………………………………………….. 11-1
Military Deception Process and Capability ………………………………………………. 11-1
Principles of Military Deception ………………………………………………………………. 11-1
Military Deception in Support of Operations …………………………………………….. 11-2
Military Deception in the Operations Process …………………………………………… 11-5

Chapter 12 REHEARSALS ……………………………………………………………………………………. 12-1
Rehearsal Basics …………………………………………………………………………………. 12-1
Rehearsal Types ………………………………………………………………………………….. 12-1
Methods of Rehearsal …………………………………………………………………………… 12-2
Rehearsal Responsibilities …………………………………………………………………….. 12-6
Rehearsal Details …………………………………………………………………………………. 12-9

Chapter 13 LIAISON ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13-1
Role of Liaison …………………………………………………………………………………….. 13-1
Liaison Responsibilities …………………………………………………………………………. 13-3
Liaison Considerations ………………………………………………………………………….. 13-8

Chapter 14 DECISIONMAKING IN EXECUTION ……………………………………………………… 14-1
Activities of Execution …………………………………………………………………………… 14-1
Rapid Decisionmaking and Synchronization Process ……………………………….. 14-3

Chapter 15 ASSESSMENT PLANS ………………………………………………………………………… 15-1
Assessment and the Operations Process ………………………………………………… 15-1

Contents

11 May 2015 FM 6-0, C1 iii

The Assessment Process ……………………………………………………………………… 15-2
Assessment Plan Development …………………………………………………………….. 15-3
Assessment Steps ……………………………………………………………………………….. 15-4

Chapter 16 AFTER ACTION REVIEWS AND REPORTS ………………………………………….. 16-1
Introduction to After Action Reviews and Reports …………………………………….. 16-1
Formal and Informal After Action Reviews ………………………………………………. 16-1
Benefits of After Action Reviews ……………………………………………………………. 16-2
Conducting After Action Reviews …………………………………………………………… 16-3
Executing After Action Reviews …………………………………………………………….. 16-6
The After Action Report ………………………………………………………………………… 16-7

Appendix A OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES ………………………………………….. A-1

Appendix B +COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS ……………………………………… B-1
Appendix C PLANS AND ORDERS FORMATS …………………………………………………………. C-1

Appendix D ANNEX FORMATS ……………………………………………………………………………….. D-1

GLOSSARY ……………………………………………………………………………… Glossary-1
REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………….References-1

INDEX……………………………………………………………………………………………. Index-1

Figures
Figure 1-1. Command post organization …………………………………………………………………….. 1-5
Figure 1-2. Integration of plans, future operations, and current operations ……………………… 1-8
Figure 3-1. Achieving understanding ………………………………………………………………………….. 3-1
Figure 3-2. Knowledge management flow …………………………………………………………………… 3-3
Figure 4-1. Sample evaluation criterion ………………………………………………………………………. 4-4
Figure 5-1. Staff study paper format example ……………………………………………………………… 5-2
Figure 6-1. Decision paper format example ………………………………………………………………… 6-2
Figure 7-1. Information briefing format example ………………………………………………………….. 7-1
Figure 7-2. +Decision briefing format example ……………………………………………………………. 7-2
Figure 7-3. Planning considerations for military briefings ……………………………………………… 7-4
Figure 7-4. Preparation considerations for military briefings ………………………………………….. 7-5
Figure 8-1. Generic base running estimate format ……………………………………………………….. 8-2
Figure 9-1. The seven steps of the military decisionmaking process ………………………………. 9-3
Figure 9-2. Step 1–receipt of the mission ……………………………………………………………………. 9-4
Figure 9-3. Step 2–mission analysis ………………………………………………………………………….. 9-7
Figure 9-4. Step 3–course of action development ……………………………………………………… 9-16
Figure 9-5. +Sample brigade course of action sketch …………………………………………………. 9-24
Figure 9-6. Step 4–course of action analysis and war-gaming ……………………………………. 9-26
Figure 9-7. Sample belt method ………………………………………………………………………………. 9-28
Figure 9-8. Sample modified belt method using lines of effort ……………………………………… 9-29
Figure 9-9. Sample avenue-in-depth method …………………………………………………………….. 9-29

Contents

iv FM 6-0, C1 11 May 2015

Figure 9-10. Sample modified avenue-in-depth method using lines of effort …………………. 9-30
Figure 9-11. Sample box method …………………………………………………………………………….. 9-30
Figure 9-12. Sample modified box method using lines of effort……………………………………. 9-31
Figure 9-13. Step 5–course of action comparison ……………………………………………………… 9-39
Figure 9-14. Step 6–course of action approval ………………………………………………………….. 9-42
Figure 9-15. Step 7–orders production, dissemination, and transition ………………………….. 9-43
Figure 10-1. Parallel sequences of the MDMP and troop leading procedures ……………….. 10-2
Figure 10-2. Sample schedule ………………………………………………………………………………… 10-4
Figure 12-1. Types of rehearsals …………………………………………………………………………….. 12-3
Figure 13-1. Example liaison officer handbook outline ……………………………………………….. 13-3
Figure 13-2. Examples of liaison officer questions …………………………………………………….. 13-4
Figure 13-3. Example recommended packing list ………………………………………………………. 13-5
Figure 13-4. Liaison checklist—before departing the sending unit ……………………………….. 13-6
Figure 13-5. Liaison duties—during the liaison tour …………………………………………………… 13-8
Figure 13-6. Liaison duties—after the liaison tour ……………………………………………………… 13-8
Figure 14-1. Rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process ……………………………….. 14-3
Figure 15-1. Assessment framework ……………………………………………………………………….. 15-5
Figure 15-2. Example end state conditions for a defense …………………………………………… 15-6
Figure 15-3. Example end state conditions for a stability operation ……………………………… 15-7
Figure C-1. Paragraph layout for plans and orders ……………………………………………………… C-6
Figure C-2. Operation plan or operation order format ………………………………………………… C-11
Figure C-3. Operation order or operation plan attachment format ……………………………….. C-22
Figure C-4. Warning order format ……………………………………………………………………………. C-24
Figure C-5. Fragmentary order format ……………………………………………………………………… C-25
Figure C-6. Example of overlay order graphic …………………………………………………………… C-27
Figure D-1. Sample Annex A (Task Organization) format …………………………………………….. D-7
Figure D-2. Sample Annex B (Intelligence) format …………………………………………………….. D-10
Figure D-3. Sample Annex C (Operations) format ……………………………………………………… D-15
Figure D-4. Sample Annex D (Fires) format ……………………………………………………………… D-21
Figure D-5. Sample Annex E (Protection) format ………………………………………………………. D-27
Figure D-6. Sample Annex F (Sustainment) format ……………………………………………………. D-34
Figure D-7. Sample Annex G (Engineer) format ………………………………………………………… D-41
Figure D-8. Sample Annex H (Signal) format ……………………………………………………………. D-46
Figure D-9. Sample Annex J (Public Affairs) format …………………………………………………… D-52
Figure D-10. Sample Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) format …………………………………… D-56
Figure D-11. Sample Annex L (Information Collection) format …………………………………….. D-62
Figure D-12. Sample Annex M (Assessment) format …………………………………………………. D-67
Figure D-13. Sample Annex N (Space Operations) format …………………………………………. D-71
Figure D-14. Sample Annex P (Host-Nation Support) format ………………………………………. D-77
Figure D-15. Sample Annex Q (Knowledge Management) format ……………………………….. D-82
Figure D-16. Sample Annex R (Reports) format ………………………………………………………… D-85

Contents

11 May 2015 FM 6-0, C1 v

Figure D-17. Sample Annex S (Special Technical Operations) format …………………………. D-87
Figure D-18. Sample Annex U (Inspector General) format …………………………………………. D-92
Figure D-19. Sample Annex V (Interagency Coordination) format ……………………………….. D-96
Figure D-20. Sample Annex W (Operational Contract Support) format ………………………. D-100
Figure D-21. Sample Annex Z (Distribution) format …………………………………………………. D-106

Tables
Introductory table-1. New Army terms …………………………………………………………………………… ix
Table 1-1. Sample shift-change briefing ……………………………………………………………………. 1-11
Table 1-2. Sample SOP for a division civil affairs operations working group ………………….. 1-14
Table 9-1. Examples of commander’s planning guidance by warfighting function ………….. 9-15
Table 9-2. Historical minimum planning ratios …………………………………………………………… 9-20
Table 9-3. Sample synchronization matrix tool ………………………………………………………….. 9-32
Table 9-4. Sample sketch note method …………………………………………………………………….. 9-33
Table 9-5. Effective war game results ………………………………………………………………………. 9-35
Table 9-6. Sample advantages and disadvantages ……………………………………………………. 9-40
Table 9-7. Sample decision matrix …………………………………………………………………………… 9-40
Table 10-1. Mission variables ………………………………………………………………………………….. 10-5
Table 10-2. Sample mission and course of action statements ……………………………………… 10-7
Table 12-1. Example sustainment and protection actions for rehearsals …………………….. 12-11
Table 13-1. Senior liaison officer rank by echelon ……………………………………………………… 13-1
Table 14-1. Decision types and related actions …………………………………………………………. 14-2
Table 14-2. Examples of change indicators ………………………………………………………………. 14-4
Table 14-3. Course of action considerations ……………………………………………………………… 14-7
Table 15-1. Assessment measures and indicators …………………………………………………….. 15-3
Table 16-1. Brigade after action report format …………………………………………………………… 16-8
Table A-1. Operational variables ……………………………………………………………………………….. A-2
Table B-1. Joint support categories ……………………………………………………………………………. B-2
Table B-2. +Army command relationships ………………………………………………………………….. B-5
Table B-3. +Army support relationships ……………………………………………………………………… B-6
Table C-1. Designated letters for dates and times ………………………………………………………. C-8
Table C-2. List of attachments and responsible staff officers ……………………………………… C-17
Table D-1. Army unit listing convention ……………………………………………………………………… D-3

vi FM 6-0, C1 11 May 2015

Preface

FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, provides commanders and their staffs with tactics
and procedures for exercising mission command. This publication supersedes ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and
Staff Officer Guide.

To comprehend the doctrine contained in this publication, readers must first understand the nature of unified
land operations as described in ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations. In addition, readers must
also fully understand the principles of mission command as described in ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0, Mission
Command, and the fundamentals of the operations process found in ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0, The Operations
Process.

The principal audience for FM 6-0 includes Army commanders, leaders, and unit staffs (officers,
noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers). Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as a joint
+headquarters or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine
concerning the range of military operations as well as the employment of joint or multinational forces. Trainers
and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

FM 6-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 6-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which FM 6-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced
in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent
publication follows the definition.

FM 6-0 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of FM 6-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and
recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (FM 6-0),
300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1300; submit an electronic DA Form 2028; or by an
e-mail to [email protected]

5 May 2014 FM 6-0 vii

Introduction
FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, provides commanders and staffs with many of the
tactics and procedures associated with exercising mission command. Mission command is the exercise of
authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the
commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0).
Mission command is both a philosophy and a warfighting function.

As the Army’s philosophy of command, mission command emphasizes that command is essentially a human
endeavor. Successful commanders understand that their leadership guides the development of teams and helps
to establish mutual trust and shared understanding throughout the force.

Mission command is also a warfighting function. The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks
and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command
and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. As a warfighting function,
mission command consists of the related tasks and a mission command system that support the exercise of
authority and direction by the commander. As a warfighting function, mission command assists commanders in
blending the art of command with the science of control, while emphasizing the human aspects of mission
command. (See ADRP 6-0 for more details.)

FM 6-0 is intended to serve several purposes. First, it provides commanders and staffs specific information they
will need in the exercise of mission command. Second, the manual provides multiple templates and examples of
products that commanders and staffs routinely use in the conduct of operations. Finally, FM 6-0 discusses roles
and responsibilities that should be understood to facilitate ease of communication among various members of
different organizations. It should be noted that although FM 6-0 provides tactics and procedures, commanders
may modify products as necessary to meet mission requirements. Local standard operating procedures (SOPs)
may also provide examples of products more suitable to specific situations.

FM 6-0 reflects Army leadership decisions to replace the mission command staff task of conduct inform and
influence activities with synchronize information-related capabilities. As a result, FM 6-0 does not use the term
inform and influence activities. However, commanders remain responsible for the mission command
commander task of inform and influence audiences inside and outside their organizations. Other changes
resulting from this decision include—

The assistant chief of staff, G-7 (S-7), inform and influence activities is replaced by the
information operations officer. The information operations officer is a special staff officer,
coordinated by the G-3 (S-3) operations officer.
The inform and influence …

Example of How to Cite

Military Regulations,

ADP, ADRP, and

FM’s

Joint Publications follow the same format (source: http://libguides.nps.edu/citation/apa#directive)

An example of how to cite AR, ADP or ADRP (All are formatted as a Corporate author, government report) Author. (date). Publication
title
(report or document number). Retrieved from URL (See American Psychological Association, 2015, p. 205)

In-Text: According to the Department of the Army (2012), . . . *** Or …(Department of the Army, 2012).
If you use a direct quote, the in-text citation should look like this: (Department of the Army, 2012, p. 9) or if the quote covers more than one page of information, use all page #s: (Department of the Army, 2012, pp. 6-9).

build

the

reference

page

cite

follows:

Author.

(Year).

Title

ocument

(Publication

Number).

Retrieved
from
URL

Department of the Army. (2012a). Army

leadership (ADP 6-22). Retrieved from http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp6_22.pdf

Department of the Army. (2012b). The
operations

process (ADRP 5-0).
Retrieved from http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp5_0.pdf

***“References by the same author (or by the same two or more authors in the same order) with the same publication date are arranged alphabetically by the title (excluding A or The)” and “Place lowercase letters–a, b, c, and so forth–immediately after the year, within the parentheses:” (American Psychological Association, 2015a, p. 182) (As they appear in the document or paper (i.e. first to appear is “2012a, second is 2012b and so on)

example
of

how

cite
a

Field

Manual

(FM):

IN-Text:
According to the Department of the Army (2014) publication, Logistics

o
perations
(FM 4-95), or …..(Department of the Army, 2014, p. 5)

The reference page should read:

Department of the Army. (2014). Logistics

operations
(FM 4-95). Retrieved from http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm4_95.pdf

OTHER EXAMPLES

Army Regulations

Department of the Army. (2007). The
Army
f
amily

a
dvocacy
p
rogram
(AR 608-18). Retrieved from http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r608_18.pdf

Directives and Instructions

Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L). (2003, May 12). The
D
efense
acquisition
system (DOD Directive 5000.1). Washington, DC: Author.

Executive Orders

Exec. Order No. 13655, 3 C.F.R. 80451 (2013) Reprinted (codified in U.S.C.)

Federal Regulations

Renewable Energy Production Incentives, 10 C.F.R. § 451 (2006).

Field Manuals

Department of the Army. (1994). Sniper
training (FM 23-10). Retrieved from http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm_23-10%2394%29.pdf

Government/Technical/Research reports

National Institute of Mental Health. (1990). Clinical training in
serious

mental

illness
(DHHS Publication No. ADM 90-1679). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

See p. 205 of the APA manual for information on citing a report from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Declaration of Independence. (1776). Retrieved from ………………

Office

Memoranda

Takia, T. (2013). Adoption of the

national
information

exchange
model within the
Department
of

Defense [Memorandum]. Retrieved from http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/2013-03- 28%20Adoption%20of%20the%NIEM%20within%20the%20DoD.pdf

WEB SITE:

Army Contacting Command. (n.d.) About U.S. Army Contracting Command. Retrieved from http://acc.army.mil/about/
Task Force 849 Report. (2008). Department of Defense task force on contracting and contract management in expeditionary ope
r
ations
. Retrieved from https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/docs/section849.pdf
U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency. (n.d.). Force management system web site. Retrieved from https://fmsweb.fms.army.mil/unprotected/splash/

DFM References

Department of the Army. (2016). Multi-service tactic
s
, techniques, and procedures for operational contract support
(ATP 4-10). Retrieved from http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp4_10.pdf
Department of the Army. (2015). How the Army runs. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College.
Department of the Army. (2009). Commander’s
g
uide to money as a weapon system. Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2014). Operational contract support (JP 4-10). Retrieved from
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp4_10.pdf
Department of the Army. (2009). Developing a performance work statement. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013). Joint l
ogistics
(JP 4-0).
Retrieved from http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf
Gansler Commission Report. (2007). Urgent reform required: Army expeditionary contracting. Retrieved from https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/gansler_commission.html
U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command. (2009). Developing a performance work statement. Retrieved from https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/publication/09-48

How to reference a lesson reading from b
l
ackboard:
U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. (n.d.). Materi
e
l d
evelopment. Retrieved from https://nrc.ncoes.army.mil/webapps/blackboard/content/listContent.jsp?course_id=_1467_1&content_id=_317374_1

Personal Communication
:

Personal communications may be private letters, memos, email, electronic bulletins boards, etc. Cite personal communications in the text of the document only (not on the reference page). An example is:
According to Major T. Lutes, the Operations Officer of 111st Transport Brigade, army drivers require more training on line haul vehicles (personal communications, April 18, 2011).

P
ower point slides:

When citing such presentations, be sure to include the term “PowerPoint slides” in brackets. List on the reference page by using the author, date, title, etc. and the “Retrieved from” URL notation:
Jones, A. (2018). How to include APA citations in a PowerPoint presentation [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from http://jones.uvm.edu/ppt/40hrenv/index.html
U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. (2018). F105: Developing
m
ateriel
[PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from classroom lecture notes
In text citation should be: (U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, 2018).

How to quote a
video
,
played as part of a classroom lecture:

Reimer, D. (1998). Army Chief of Staff address to CGSC. Retrieved from classroom lecture [F101]
In text citation should be: (Reimer, 1998).

Branching Paths: A Novel Teacher Evaluation Model for Faculty Development

James P. Bavis and Ahn G. Nu

Department of English, Purdue University

ENGL 101: Course Name

Dr. Richard Teeth

Jan. 30, 2020

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Page numbers begin on the first page and follow on every subsequent page without interruption. No other information (e.g., authors’ last names) is required.

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Authors’ names appear two lines below the title. They should be written as follows:First name, middle initial(s), last name.

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Follow authors’ affiliations with the number and name of the course, the instructor’s name and title, and the assignment’s due date.

Abstract

A large body of assessment literature suggests that students’ evaluations of their teachers

(SETs) can fail to measure the construct of teaching in a variety of contexts. This can

compromise faculty development efforts that rely on information from SETs. The disconnect

between SET results and faculty development efforts is exacerbated in educational contexts

that demand particular teaching skills that SETs do not value in proportion to their local

importance (or do not measure at all). This paper responds to these challenges by proposing an

instrument for the assessment of teaching that allows institutional stakeholders to define the

teaching construct in a way they determine to suit the local context. The main innovation of this

instrument relative to traditional SETs is that it employs a branching “tree” structure populated

by binary-choice items based on the Empirically derived, Binary-choice, Boundary-definition

(EBB) scale developed by Turner and Upshur for ESL writing assessment. The paper argues

that this structure can allow stakeholders to define the teaching construct by changing the order

and sensitivity of the nodes in the tree of possible outcomes, each of which corresponds to a

specific teaching skill. The paper concludes by outlining a pilot study that will examine the

differences between the proposed EBB instrument and a traditional SET employing series of

multiple-choice questions (MCQs) that correspond to Likert scale values.

Keywords: college teaching, student evaluations of teaching, scale development, EBB

scale, pedagogies, educational assessment, faculty development

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An abstract quickly summarizes the main points of the paper that follows it. The APA 7 manual does not give explicit directions for how long abstracts should be, but it does note that most abstracts do not exceed 250 words (p. 38). It also notes that professional publishers (like academic journals) may have a variety of rules for abstracts, and that writers should typically defer to these.

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Follow the abstract with a selection of keywords that describe the important ideas or subjects in your paper. These help online readers search for your paper in a database. The keyword list should have its first line indented. Begin the list with the label “Keywords:” (note the italics and the colon). Follow this with a list of keywords written in lowercase (except for proper nouns) and separated by commas. Do not place a period at the end of the list.

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Branching Paths: A Novel Teacher Evaluation Model for Faculty Development

According to Theall (2017), “Faculty evaluation and development cannot be considered

separately … evaluation without development is punitive, and development without evaluation is

guesswork” (p. 91). As the practices that constitute modern programmatic faculty development

have evolved from their humble beginnings to become a commonplace feature of university life

(Lewis, 1996), a variety of tactics to evaluate the proficiency of teaching faculty for development

purposes have likewise become commonplace. These include measures as diverse as peer

observations, the development of teaching portfolios, and student evaluations.

One such measure, the student evaluation of teacher (SET), has been virtually

ubiquitous since at least the 1990s (Wilson, 1998). Though records of SET-like instruments can

be traced to work at Purdue University in the 1920s (Remmers & Brandenburg, 1927), most

modern histories of faculty development suggest that their rise to widespread popularity went

hand-in-hand with the birth of modern faculty development programs in the 1970s, when

universities began to adopt them in response to student protest movements criticizing

mainstream university curricula and approaches to instruction (Gaff & Simpson, 1994; Lewis,

1996; McKeachie, 1996). By the mid-2000s, researchers had begun to characterize SETs in

terms like “…the predominant measure of university teacher performance […] worldwide”

(Pounder, 2007, p. 178). Today, SETs play an important role in teacher assessment and faculty

development at most universities (Davis, 2009). Recent SET research practically takes the

presence of some form of this assessment on most campuses as a given. Spooren et al.

(2017), for instance, merely note that that SETs can be found at “almost every institution of

higher education throughout the world” (p. 130). Similarly, Darwin (2012) refers to teacher

evaluation as an established orthodoxy, labeling it a “venerated,” “axiomatic” institutional

practice (p. 733).

Moreover, SETs do not only help universities direct their faculty development efforts.

They have also come to occupy a place of considerable institutional importance for their role in

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personnel considerations, informing important decisions like hiring, firing, tenure, and

promotion. Seldin (1993, as cited in Pounder, 2007) finds that 86% of higher educational

institutions use SETs as important factors in personnel decisions. A 1991 survey of department

chairs found 97% used student evaluations to assess teaching performance (US Department of

Education). Since the mid-late 1990s, a general trend towards comprehensive methods of

teacher evaluation that include multiple forms of assessment has been observed

(Berk, 2005). However, recent research suggests the usage of SETs in personnel decisions is

still overwhelmingly common, though hard percentages are hard to come by, perhaps owing to

the multifaceted nature of these decisions (Boring et al., 2017; Galbraith et al., 2012). In certain

contexts, student evaluations can also have ramifications beyond the level of individual

instructors. Particularly as public schools have experienced pressure in recent decades to adopt

neoliberal, market-based approaches to self-assessment and adopt a student-as-consumer

mindset (Darwin, 2012; Marginson, 2009), information from evaluations can even feature in

department- or school-wide funding decisions (see, for instance, the Obama Administration’s

Race to the Top initiative, which awarded grants to K-12 institutions that adopted value-added

models for teacher evaluation).

However, while SETs play a crucial role in faulty development and personnel decisions

for many education institutions, current approaches to SET administration are not as well-suited

to these purposes as they could be. This paper argues that a formative, empirical approach to

teacher evaluation developed in response to the demands of the local context is better-suited

for helping institutions improve their teachers. It proposes the Heavilon Evaluation of Teacher,

or HET, a new teacher assessment instrument that can strengthen current approaches to

faculty development by making them more responsive to teachers’ local contexts. It also

proposes a pilot study that will clarify the differences between this new instrument and the

Introductory Composition at Purdue (ICaP) SET, a more traditional instrument used for similar

purposes. The results of this study will direct future efforts to refine the proposed instrument.

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Methods section, which follows, will propose a pilot study that compares the results of the

proposed instrument to the results of a traditional SET (and will also provide necessary

background information on both of these evaluations). The paper will conclude with a discussion

of how the results of the pilot study will inform future iterations of the proposed instrument and,

more broadly, how universities should argue for local development of assessments.

Literature Review

Effective Teaching: A Contextual Construct

The validity of the instrument this paper proposes is contingent on the idea that it is

possible to systematically measure a teacher’s ability to teach. Indeed, the same could be said

for virtually all teacher evaluations. Yet despite the exceeding commonness of SETs and the

faculty development programs that depend on their input, there is little scholarly consensus on

precisely what constitutes “good” or “effective” teaching. It would be impossible to review the

entire history of the debate surrounding teaching effectiveness, owing to its sheer scope—such

a summary might need to begin with, for instance, Cicero and Quintilian. However, a cursory

overview of important recent developments (particularly those revealed in meta-analyses of

empirical studies of teaching) can help situate the instrument this paper proposes in relevant

academic conversations.

Meta-analysis 1. One core assumption that undergirds many of these conversations is

the notion that good teaching has effects that can be observed in terms of student achievement.

A meta-analysis of 167 empirical studies that investigated the effects of various teaching factors

on student achievement (Kyriakides et al., 2013) supported the effectiveness of a set of

teaching factors that the authors group together under the label of the “dynamic model” of

teaching. Seven of the eight factors (Orientation, Structuring, Modeling, Questioning,

Assessment, Time Management, and Classroom as Learning Environment) corresponded to

moderate average effect sizes (of between 0.34–0.41 standard deviations) in measures of

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student achievement. The eighth factor, Application (defined as seatwork and small-group tasks

oriented toward practice of course concepts), corresponded to only a small yet still significant

effect size of 0.18. The lack of any single decisive factor in the meta-analysis supports the idea

that effective teaching is likely a multivariate construct. However, the authors also note the

context-dependent nature of effective teaching. Application, the least-important teaching factor

overall, proved more important in studies examining young students (p. 148). Modeling, by

contrast, was especially important for older students.

Meta-analysis 2. A different meta-analysis that argues for the importance of factors like

clarity and setting challenging goals (Hattie, 2009) nevertheless also finds that the effect sizes

of various teaching factors can be highly context-dependent. For example, effect sizes for

homework range from 0.15 (a small effect) to 0.64 (a moderately large effect) based on the level

of education examined. Similar ranges are observed for differences in academic subject (e.g.,

math vs. English) and student ability level. As Snook et al. (2009) note in their critical response

to Hattie, while it is possible to produce a figure for the average effect size of a particular

teaching factor, such averages obscure the importance of context.

Meta-analysis 3. A final meta-analysis (Seidel & Shavelson, 2007) found generally

small average effect sizes for most teaching factors—organization and academic domain-

specific learning activities showed the biggest cognitive effects (0.33 and 0.25, respectively).

Here, again, however, effectiveness varied considerably due to contextual factors like domain of

study and level of education in ways that average effect sizes do not indicate.

These pieces of evidence suggest that there are multiple teaching factors that produce

measurable gains in student achievement and that the relative importance of individual factors

can be highly dependent on contextual factors like student identity. This is in line with a well-

documented phenomenon in educational research that complicates attempts to measure

teaching effectiveness purely in terms of student achievement. This is that “the largest source of

variation in student learning is attributable to differences in what students bring to school – their

abilities and attitudes, and family and community” (McKenzie et al., 2005, p. 2). Student

achievement varies greatly due to non-teacher factors like socio-economic status and home life

(Snook et al., 2009). This means that, even to the extent that it is possible to observe the

effectiveness of certain teaching behaviors in terms of student achievement, it is difficult to set

generalizable benchmarks or standards for student achievement. Thus is it also difficult to make

true apples-to-apples comparisons about teaching effectiveness between different educational

contexts: due to vast differences between different kinds of students, a notion of what

constitutes highly effective teaching in one context may not in another. This difficulty has

featured in criticism of certain meta-analyses that have purported to make generalizable claims

about what teaching factors produce the biggest effects (Hattie, 2009). A variety of other

commentators have also made similar claims about the importance of contextual factors in

teaching effectiveness for decades (see, e.g., Bloom et al., 1956; Cashin, 1990; Theall, 2017).

The studies described above mainly measure teaching effectiveness in terms of

academic achievement. It should certainly be noted that these quantifiable measures are not

generally regarded as the only outcomes of effective teaching worth pursuing. Qualitative

outcomes like increased affinity for learning and greater sense of self-efficacy are also important

learning goals. Here, also, local context plays a large role.

SETs: Imperfect Measures of Teaching

As noted in this paper’s introduction, SETs are commonly used to assess teaching

performance and inform faculty development efforts. Typically, these take the form of an end-of-

term summative evaluation comprised of multiple-choice questions (MCQs) that allow students

to rate statements about their teachers on Likert scales. These are often accompanied with

short-answer responses which may or may not be optional.

SETs serve important institutional purposes. While commentators have noted that there

are crucial aspects of instruction that students are not equipped to judge (Benton & Young,

2018), SETs nevertheless give students a rare institutional voice. They represent an opportunity

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to offer anonymous feedback on their teaching experience and potentially address what they

deem to be their teacher’s successes or failures. Students are also uniquely positioned to offer

meaningful feedback on an instructors’ teaching because they typically have much more

extensive firsthand experience of it than any other educational stakeholder. Even peer

observers only witness a small fraction of the instructional sessions during a given semester.

Students with perfect attendance, by contrast, witness all of them. Thus, in a certain sense, a

student can theoretically assess a teacher’s ability more authoritatively than even peer mentors

can.

While historical attempts to validate SETs have produced mixed results, some studies

have demonstrated their promise. Howard (1985), for instance, finds that SET are significantly

more predictive of teaching effectiveness than self-report, peer, and trained-observer

assessments. A review of several decades of literature on teaching evaluations (Watchel, 1998)

found that a majority of researchers believe SETs to be generally valid and reliable, despite

occasional misgivings. This review notes that even scholars who support SETs frequently argue

that they alone cannot direct efforts to improve teaching and that multiple avenues of feedback

are necessary (L’hommedieu et al., 1990; Seldin, 1993).

Finally, SETs also serve purposes secondary to the ostensible goal of improving

instruction that nonetheless matter. They can be used to bolster faculty CVs and assign

departmental awards, for instance. SETs can also provide valuable information unrelated to

teaching. It would be hard to argue that it not is useful for a teacher to learn, for example, that a

student finds the class unbearably boring, or that a student finds the teacher’s personality so

unpleasant as to hinder her learning. In short, there is real value in understanding students’

affective experience of a particular class, even in cases when that value does not necessarily

lend itself to firm conclusions about the teacher’s professional abilities.

However, a wealth of scholarly research has demonstrated that SETs are prone to fail in

certain contexts. A common criticism is that SETs can frequently be confounded by factors

external to the teaching construct. The best introduction to the research that serves as the basis

for this claim is probably Neath (1996), who performs something of a meta-analysis by

presenting these external confounds in the form of twenty sarcastic suggestions to teaching

faculty. Among these are the instructions to “grade leniently,” “administer ratings before tests”

(p. 1365), and “not teach required courses” (#11) (p. 1367). Most of Neath’s advice reflects an

overriding observation that teaching evaluations tend to document students’ affective feelings

toward a class, rather than their teachers’ abilities, even when the evaluations explicitly ask

students to judge the latter.

Beyond Neath, much of the available research paints a similar picture. For example, a

study of over 30,000 economics students concluded that “the poorer the student considered his

teacher to be [on an SET], the more economics he understood” (Attiyeh & Lumsden, 1972). A

1998 meta-analysis argued that “there is no evidence that the use of teacher ratings improves

learning in the long run” (Armstrong, 1998, p. 1223). A 2010 National Bureau of Economic

Research study found that high SET scores for a course’s instructor correlated with “high

contemporaneous course achievement,” but “low follow-on achievement” (in other words, the

students would tend to do well in the course, but poor in future courses in the same field of

study. Others observing this effect have suggested SETs reward a pandering, “soft-ball”

teaching style in the initial course (Carrell & West, 2010). More recent research suggests that

course topic can have a significant effect on SET scores as well: teachers of “quantitative

courses” (i.e., math-focused classes) tend to receive lower evaluations from students than their

humanities peers (Uttl & Smibert, 2017).

Several modern SET studies have also demonstrated bias on the basis of gender

(Anderson & Miller, 1997; Basow, 1995), physical appearance/sexiness (Ambady & Rosenthal,

1993), and other identity markers that do not affect teaching quality. Gender, in particular, has

attracted significant attention. One recent study examined two online classes: one in which

instructors identified themselves to students as male, and another in which they identified as

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female (regardless of the instructor’s actual gender) (Macnell et al., 2015). The classes were

identical in structure and content, and the instructors’ true identities were concealed from

students. The study found that students rated the male identity higher on average. However, a

few studies have demonstrated the reverse of the gender bias mentioned above (that is, women

received higher scores) (Bachen et al., 1999) while others have registered no gender bias one

way or another (Centra & Gaubatz, 2000).

The goal of presenting these criticisms is not necessarily to diminish the institutional

importance of SETs. Of course, insofar as institutions value the instruction of their students, it is

important that those students have some say in the content and character of that instruction.

Rather, the goal here is simply to demonstrate that using SETs for faculty development

purposes—much less for personnel decisions—can present problems. It is also to make the

case that, despite the abundance of literature on SETs, there is still plenty of room for scholarly

attempts to make these instruments more useful.

Empirical Scales and Locally-Relevant Evaluation

One way to ensure that teaching assessments are more responsive to the demands of

teachers’ local contexts is to develop those assessments locally, ideally via a process that

involves the input of a variety of local stakeholders. Here, writing assessment literature offers a

promising path forward: empirical scale development, the process of structuring and calibrating

instruments in response to local input and data (e.g., in the context of writing assessment,

student writing samples and performance information). This practice contrasts, for instance, with

deductive approaches to scale development that attempt to represent predetermined theoretical

constructs so that results can be generalized.

Supporters of the empirical process argue that empirical scales have several

advantages. They are frequently posited as potential solutions to well-documented reliability and

validity issues that can occur with theoretical or intuitive scale development (Brindley, 1998;

Turner & Upshur, 1995, 2002). Empirical scales can also help researchers avoid issues caused

by subjective or vaguely-worded standards in other kinds of scales (Brindley, 1998) because

they require buy-in from local stakeholders who must agree on these standards based on

their understanding of the local context. Fulcher et al. (2011) note the following, for instance:

Measurement-driven scales suffer from descriptional inadequacy. They are not sensitive

to the communicative context or the interactional complexities of language use. The level

of abstraction is too great, creating a gulf between the score and its meaning. Only with

a richer description of contextually based performance, can we strengthen the meaning

of the score, and hence the validity of score-based inferences. (pp. 8–9)

There is also some evidence that the branching structure of the EBB scale specifically

can allow for more reliable and valid assessments, even if it is typically easier to calibrate and

use conventional scales (Hirai & Koizumi, 2013). Finally, scholars have also argued that

theory-based approaches to scale development do not always result in instruments that

realistically capture ordinary classroom situations (Knoch, 2007, 2009).

The most prevalent criticism of empirical scale development in the literature is that the

local, contingent nature of empirical scales basically discards any notion of their results’

generalizability. Fulcher (2003), for instance, makes this basic criticism of the EBB scale even

as he subsequently argues that “the explicitness of the design methodology for EBBs is

impressive, and their usefulness in pedagogic settings is attractive” (p. 107). In the context of

this particular paper’s aims, there is also the fact that the literature supporting empirical scale

development originates in the field of writing assessment, rather than teaching assessment.

Moreover, there is little extant research into the applications of empirical scale development for

the latter purpose. Thus, there is no guarantee that the benefits of empirical development

approaches can be realized in the realm of teaching assessment. There is also no guarantee

that they cannot. In taking a tentative step towards a better understanding of how these

assessment schema function in a new context, then, the study described in the next section

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asks whether the principles that guide …

Political Science: Mission Command

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